Copyright Law Blog: Exclusive Rights

Category Archives: Music

“Plaintiffs may only recover one award of statutory damages per musical composition per Defendant”

Shourin Sen - 22 February 2010 – 9:00 am

Filed under Damages, Music

MCS Music America, Inc. v. YAHOO! Inc., 2010 WL 500430 (M.D. Tenn. 2010)

Plaintiffs brought a copyright infringement suit alleging, inter alia, that Yahoo!’s music subscription service had distributed without permission a total of 308 different versions of 205 of its musical composition. This came about, according to the complaint, because Yahoo!, distributed different versions of some of the songs that were performed by different artists, produced at different times by different people, and were distributed by different record labels. The plaintiff contended that it was entitled to a $150k in statutory damages for each of the 308 versions.

Yahoo! filed a motion 12(c) judgment on the pleadings arguing that the Plaintiffs were only allowed to seek one award of statutory damages per work infringed. The Middle District of Tennessee (Campbell, C.J.) granted Yahoo!’s motion and found that the statutory damages available to the plaintiffs, if any, were recoverable only on the 215 musical compositions alleged in the Complaint, rather than the 308 total recorded versions of the 215 musical compositions. Stated the Court, “Plaintiffs may only recover one award of statutory damages per musical composition per Defendant.”

High Court of England and Wales denies appeal of tariffs set by Copyright Board

Shourin Sen - 19 February 2010 – 9:00 am

Filed under Copyright Royalty Board, Music, Royalty Collection Societies, Sound Recordings, UK

Phonographic Performance Ltd v British Hospitality Association & Ors [2009] EWHC 209 (Ch) (12 February 2010)

Last Friday, the High Court (Arnold, J.) denied an appeal of a decision by the Copyright Tribunal brought by the performance rights society, Phonographic Performance Limited. The Copyright Tribunal had found that the tariffs PPL accessed for the public performance of sound recordings in (i) public houses, bars, restaurants ad cafes, (ii) shops and stores, and (iii) factories and offices were unreasonable.

To briefly review, the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1998 provided that the public performance of a broadcast to an audience who had not paid for admission did not infringe any sound recording. PPL had previously claimed that the exception violated violated Article 8(2) of Council Directive 92/100/EC of 19 November 1992. Phonographic Performance Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry [2004] EWHC 1795 (Ch), [2004] EMLR 30).

The Government exercised its powers under section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972 to implement Article 11(1)(b) of European Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001, by means of regulation 21(1) of the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003, SI 2003/2498. The practical effect of the amendment was that many establishments needed to obtain a license to publicly perform sound recordings that they had previously played for free.

In December 2004, PPL noted its new tariffs, which came into full effect in 2006, to the Department of State. The new tariffs, in addition to creating a “delivery system neutral fee” also changed the rates accessed to performers of sound recordings under the existing structures. The changes in tariffs were referred to the Copyright Tribunal by the Secretary of State in October 2005 for a determination as to whether they were reasonable.

The Copyright Tribunal issued a final decision on October 15, 2009 finding that the tariffs were not reasonable, and made an order under Section 128 B(3)(a) changing the tariffs. The Tribunal reinstated the previous tariffs, extended them to all means of delivery, but with (i) an increase in the tariffs payable by 10% in addition to an adjustment in line with the Retail Price Index and (ii) the imposition of a concessionary discount rate for some small users.

Ground A: the investigatory obligations of the Copyright Tribunal

The argument that Copyright Tribunal was under an obligation to investigate the reasonableness of the tariffs was central to a number of PPL’s arguments on appeal. The Court found that while the Tribunal’s role under 128B was inquisitorial and not adversarial, it did not have an obligation to investigate. The Tribunal, according to the Court, only had to take into account the relevant considerations, and it’s obligations were fulfilled by considering the record and parties’ briefings.

Grounds B & C: the Performance Rights Society tariffs and previous tariffs as best competitor

PPL’s second and third grounds for appeal were that the Tribunal should have used the tariffs used by the Performance Rights Society, the tariff collection society for righsholders of musical works, and not the previous tariff rates as “best competitor.” The Court found that the Tribunal did not make an error of law by taking into consideration the PRS tariffs, and only finding that they suggested a modest increase in PLL’s tariffs; and that the Tribunal did not make an error in considering the previous tariff rates as best competitor.

Ground D: market reaction

PPL argued that the Tribunal failed to take into account the increase in numbers of licensees (81,921 in 2005 to 105,981 in 2008), as an indicator of the reasonableness of the tariffs. In opposition, the Interested Parties claimed that the increase was due to the removal of the exceptions under Section 72, which required more users to acquire a license. The Court found that the Tribunal should have directly addressed the argument, but that the reasoning used by the Tribunal showed that it did not consider the increase in numbers to be indicative of reasonableness.

Ground E: measurement of audience

PPL argued that the Tribunal committed material error by not considering that the new tariffs accounted for the size of a venue, where the old tariffs did not. The Court found that this may show that the new tariffs are more reasonable than the old tariffs, but not that the Tribunal made an error in concluding that the new tariffs were unreasonable.

Ground F: the statutory factors

The statutory factors for which the Tribunal must consider when evaluating a tariff, set forth in section 128A(7), include “(c) [the] commercial benefit a potential licensee is likely to obtain from playing the excepted sound recordings.” PPL contended that the Tribunal did not adequately consider the factor. The Court found that the Tribunal made the conclusion, which was in its discretion, that the factor did not support an increase, except to the extent that the new tariffs covered PPL’s new rights in the broadcast of sound recordings.

Ground G: the concessionary discount

PPL argued that Tribunal made an error by imposing the concessionary discount. The Court found that the Tribunal was within its discretion in finding that the concessionary discount was reasonable to balance the increase of 10% it granted on top of the old tariffs.

Costs

PPL also appealed the decision of the Tribunal to order it to pay half the costs of the Reference. PPL contended that the costs order “did not reflect the inquisitorial nature of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under [S]ection 128B.” The Court affirmed the order, finding that the awarding of costs “was within the ambit of [the Tribunal's] jurisdiction.”

Bombay High Court: Authority to grant compulsory licenses exclusively vested with Copyright Board

Shourin Sen - 9 February 2010 – 9:00 am

Filed under Compulsory License, Copyright Royalty Board, India, Music, Royalty Collection Societies, Sound Recordings

Music Choice India Private Limited v. Phonographic Performance Limited, Appeal No. 150 of 2009 in Suit No. 2124 of 2007 (High Court at Bombay 2010)

Music Choice India wanted to launch a 24 hour music channel in India that would only play music and static graphics. The broadcaster entered into negotiations with Phonographic Performance, a royalty collection society, for the necessary rights. The negotiations stalled (with Music Choice offering 4-7% of prorated net profits and Phonographic Performance demanding 50% of end user price), and in March 2007 Music Choice filed an application for a compulsory license under section 31(1)(b) of the Indian Copyright Act to the Copyright Board at New Dehli.

It can take over two years for the Copyright Board to rule on an application. So in August 2007, Music Choice also filed suit in a trial court in Bombay seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that it had a license to begin broadcasting immediately on the condition that it pay the compulsory royalty rate set by the Copyright Board, when the Board was able to rule on its application; or in the alternative, that the Court allow for it to pay the 4-7% of prorated net profits it proposed in negotiations or another amount set by the court until the Board had a chance to rule on its application. The trial court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

On appeal, the Bombay High Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the suit. The High Court found that, although it could hear appeals from the Copyright Board on compulsory license applications, it did not have jurisdiction to hear a similar suit brought from a Bombay trial court. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that “[c]ourts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.” The Bombay High Court found that the legislation enabling the compulsory licensing regime was a special statute and a self-sufficient piece of legislation, which barred general civil trial courts from hearing applications.

(h/t Prashant Reddy at Spicy IP)

80′s hit “Down Under” infringes “Kookaburra,” Australian Fed Court

Shourin Sen - 5 February 2010 – 9:00 am

Filed under Australia, Music

In early August, I mentioned a case Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Ltd v EMI Songs Australia Pty Limited pending in the Federal Court of Australia in Sydney. To briefly review, Larrikin, an Australian music publisher, alleged that the 1980s hit “Down Under” infringed it’s copyright in the round “Kookaburra Sits in the Old Gum Tree.” At the time, the Court found that Larrikin was the rightsholder of “Kookaburra,” and the original author had not assigned the song to the Victorian Girl Guides in 1932.

The Honourable Justice Jacobson found yesterday (Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Ltd v EMI Songs Australia Pty Limited [2010] FCA 29) that “Down Under” infringed “Kookaburra,” and that Larrikin was also entitled to recover damages for the infringment under the Fair Trading Act. The Court schedule proceedings on damages but noted that Larrikin’s claim to be entitled to 40-60% of the income of “Down Under” “grossly over-reache[d] a proper allocation of any such entitlement.”

Infringement

A plaintiff under the Australian Copyright Act must show that a defendant copied a “substantial part” of her work. The Court found that “Down Under” was infringing because a qualitatively important part of the song was appropriated and that, “although the question of quantity is secondary to that of quality, it is worthwhile noting that two of the four bars or phrases of “Kookaburra” have been reproduced in Down Under (or 50% of the song).” The Court noted that “Kookburra” was a simple work, but had sufficient originality to be granted copyright protection, and that the appropriation merited a finding of infringement.

First Circuit: Copyright Act does not preempt termination of license under NY contract law

Shourin Sen - 2 February 2010 – 9:00 am

Filed under Licensing, Music, Preemption, Termination

Latin American Music Co. v. American Society Of Composers Authors And Publishers, 2010 WL 324526 (1st Cir. 2010)

The First Circuit (Torruella, Baldock, Howard writing) addressed what is to my knowledge a novel issue concerning the requirement that a transfer of ownership must be in writing. Caballo Viejo, which translates to “Old Horse,” is a popular folk song in Venezuela. In September 1981, the composer of Caballo Viejo granted exclusive rights in the song to a predecessor of a predecessor of ASCAP. A predecessor of ASCAP (which obtained the rights from the predecessor of the predecessor, got that?) transferred exclusive rights in the song to a predecessor of Latin American Music Company in 1982. The contract between the predecessor of ASCAP and the predecessor of Latin American Music Company, which was formed in New York, did not specify a termination date, the conditions under which the exclusive license could be terminated, or the manner in which the license could be terminated.

A dispute arose between ASCAP and Latin American Music Company over copyright ownership. ASCAP claimed that it was the actual owner of the song because its predecessor had terminated the 1982 contract granting exclusive rights to Latin American Music Company. The only testimony presented at trial on the issue was a deposition of the president of ASCAP’s predecessor, stating that he had terminated the 1982 agreement with Latin American Music Company’s predecessor during a conversation with the counterparty’s president.

The First Circuit stated that New York law provides that an agreement of this type “remains in force for a reasonable time and is subject to termination upon reasonable notice. Italian & French Wine Co. of Buffalo, Inc. v. Negociants U.S.A., Inc., 842 F.Supp. 693, 699 (W.D.N.Y.1993) (“[W]ell-settled New York law [ ] provides that a contract with no stated duration is terminable only after a reasonable duration and after reasonable notice is given.”); see also Laugh Factory, Inc. v. Basciano, 608 F.Supp.2d 549, 556 (S.D.N.Y.2009); Rogers v. HSN Direct Joint Venture, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12111, at * 3 (S.D .N.Y. Aug. 6, 1999).”

On appeal, Latin American Music Company argued that the Copyright Act preempted (conflict preemption) the New York State contract law default rule of termination; that the termination had to be in writing. Title 17 Section 204 of the Copyright Act provides:

(a) A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.

Latin American Music Company argued that since it had owned exclusive rights in the song, the termination of the agreement, without a writing, was an invalid transfer of ownership. Since there was no writing, according to Latin American Music Company, there was no transfer.

The Court found that Section 204 did not apply to terminations of copyright ownership under New York State Law:

Section 204, which requires a writing signed by the transferor, however, applies to the transfer or grant of copyright ownership, not to the termination of such a transfer or grant. [Latin American Music Company] cites no case suggesting otherwise, nor are we are aware of any such case. Moreover, extending-204 to the termination of copyright interests would lead to untenable results. A transferee of a copyright interest could effectively veto a lawful termination of that interest by refusing to reconvey that interest to the terminating party under-204. For example, in this case, [Latin American Music Company], the transferee, could have prevented [ASCAP's predecessor in interest] from terminating the exclusive license by simply choosing not to reconvey the license to West Side through either an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of transfer.

The First Circuit also found that 17 U.S.C. 203 did not preempt the transfer. The Court found that the section only applied to situations where an author or an author’s statutory heirs are terminating a grant.

Supreme Court denies cert in Arista Records v. Launch Media

Shourin Sen - 26 January 2010 – 1:26 pm

Filed under Compulsory License, Copyright Royalty Board, Digital Audio Transmission, Music, Supreme Court

On Monday, the Supreme Court denied Sony BMG’s cert petition in Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 2009 WL 2568733 (2d. Cir. 2009). If a person offers an “interactive service,” as defined in the Act, she must pay an individual licensing fee for musical selections and not just the compulsory license rate set by the Copyright Royalty Board. The general rationale behind the provision is to ensure that webcasters must individually clear songs if they offer an on-demand musical service, not just pay the compulsory royalty rate.

Launch Media provided an internet radio site that allowed users to create stations from their preferences, such as a genre, artist or song. Sony argued it was an interactive service, defined in the Act as a service “that enables a member of the publc to receive a transmission of a program specially created for the recipient, or on request, a transmission of a particular sound recording …, which is selected by or on behalf of the recipient.”

The Second Circuit found that Launch Media service was not an “interactive service” and that the company only needed to obtain a compulsory license to offer musical selections. Sony BMG petitioned the Supreme Court, and was denied.

Australian court finds plaintiff is owner of “Kookaburra”; case to proceed to issue of infringement

Shourin Sen - 1 August 2009 – 1:00 am

Filed under Australia, Foreign, Music, Ownership

Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Ltd v EMI Songs Australia Pty Limited [2009] FCA 799

It feels good to be blogging again, and I have a charming little decision to come back to. On Friday, the Honourable Justice Jacobson of the Federal Court of Australia, New South Whales District, issued a decision in Larrikin Music Publishing’s infringement suit against EMI and the author’s of the ’80s hit “Down Under.” This suit has garnered a fair bit of publicity on the intertubes. To briefly review, Larrikin, an Australian music publisher, alleged that “Down Under” infringed it’s copyright in the round “Kookaburra Sits in the Old Gum Tree.”

Men at Work’s performance of “Down Under”

Justice Jacobson had requested briefing on the preliminary issue of whether Larrikin was the copyright owner of the musical composition. “Kookaburra” was penned in 1932 as an entry in a competition/fundraiser conducted by the Girl Guides Association of Victoria. (The song won.) One of the rules that accompanied the advertisement for entry stated that “[a]ll matter entered to become the property of the Guide Association.” Neither party could locate the entry materials. EMI argued that an assignment could be presumed from the circumstances, that the author of “Kookaburra” was aware of the printed contest rules and accepted the terms through her entry, and that by including her name in the entry — ah, the age of hand-written correspondence – she wasn’t merely providing contact information, but executing a valid assignment.

A Performance of “Kookaburra sits in the Old Gum Tree” by KaiLi kids

In the question at bar, the Court addressed whether, under the Australian Copyright Act of 1912, which was in effect in 1932, the clause in the rules of entry assigned the copyright in “Kookaburra” to the Victorian Girl Guides. Section 5(2) of the1912 Australian Copyright Act (which is derived from the 1911 British Copyright Act) provides that no “assignment or grant shall be valid unless it is in writing signed by the owner of the right in respect of which the assignment or grant is made, or by his duly authorized agent.”

Justice Jacobson found that, at least for purposes of the suit, Larrikin was the copyright owner of “Kookaburra.” The Court found that it was equally probable that the composer learned of the competition by word of mouth and was not aware of the rules; that the communications between the Girl Guides and the author of “Kookaburra” show that there was no assignment; that the inclusion of the author’s name in the entry was likely for identification purposes and not an assignation; and that the operative language, “all matter entered [in the competition] to become the property” of the Victorian Girl Guides, was “more apt” to have referred to the physical property than the copyright in the work.

Assignments and burden:

The Court appeared to toy with the idea that there should be a burden on the defendants to prove that the author of “Kookaburra” executed an assignment. See, for example:

The test is that there must be shown to be more than “conflicting inferences of equal degrees of probability so that the choice between them is a mere matter of conjecture.” (117, citing Nominal Defendant v Owens (1978) 22 ALR 128 at 132.)

* * * * *

It is apparent that the admissibility of the evidence must be distinguished from its sufficiency to establish or support an affirmative conclusion in favour of the party who tenders it, when the burden of proof lies upon that party. (163, citing Lustre Hosiery Limited v York [1935] HCA 71; (1935) 54 CLR 134, 138–139 (Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ) (emphasis added.)

If it was indeed the intent of the Court to assume a burden on behalf of the defendant, there are policy rationales for such a conclusion. William Patry argues that “the purpose of the writing requirement is not to effectuate the parties’ intent but principally to protect authors from those claiming, contrary to the author’s view of the facts, that he or she transferred rights in the work. The purpose of the writing requirement is thus to effectuate a congressional policy of protecting authors, even from themselves if need be.” Patry on Copyright at 5-218, citing Imperial Residential Design, Inc. v. Palms Development Group, Inc., 70 F.3d 96 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he chief purpose of section 204(a), (like the Statute of Frauds), is to resolve disputes between copyright owners and transferees and to protect copyright holders from persons mistakenly or fraudulently claiming oral licenses or copyright ownership.”) (emphasis added); Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Section 204 ensures that the creator of a work will not give away his copyright inadvertently and forces a party who wants to use the copyrighted work to negotiate with the creator to determine precisely what rights are being transferred and at what price.”)

Three major labels float idea of university student licensing system

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Shourin Sen - 9 December 2008 – 7:30 pm

Filed under Music, News

Wired is reporting some exciting copyright news. Apparently three of the big four labels have signed on to a plan that would create a royalty collection system for college ISPs. In exchange for a small tuition fee, students would be granted the right to download, share with other students, and manipulate music.

Nonprofit technology advocate Educates is shopping a version of the unlimited music plan on behalf of Warner and the other major labels to several high-profile American universities including Cornell, Columbia and the University of Chicago (see slideshow). Although talks are in the early stages, they could lead to ISP-level music licenses offered to the general public.

* * * * *

In return for a university paying fees to Choruss [a non-profit royalty collection agency], its students would be able to continue downloading as they have been – bit torrent, Limewire and so on – without fear of legal reprisal. Unlike previous plans that require the use of onerous digital rights management, this one would allow students to download music in the unprotected formats they prefer, using the hardware, software and networks of their choice.

The proposed unlimited music service, as late in coming as it is, could make more sense to both labels and fans than the current system of download-and-sue, and it would allow for edge-of-network licenses for mashups, playlists and so on, with no DRM. As long as the system is priced fairly – and from what we’ve heard, the monthly per-student price would be south of $5 per month – it could provide a blueprint for larger ISP-level music sharing licensing. At this point, universities are still assessing the plan.

“Cornell is participating with the other universities in discussions to try to understand the Warner Music Group proposal,” a university spokesman told Wired.com. Techdirt’s source said the slideshow was shown at Columbia, Cornell, MIT, Penn State, Stanford, University of California at Berkeley, University of Chicago, University of Colorado, University of Michigan, University of Washington and University of Virginia.

Above all, I’m struck by how Warner’s proposed system would be both more efficient and effective than the recording industry’s current enforcement tactics. Given the widespread occurrence of infringing file sharing, it’s next to impossible to make the argument that the major labels’ litigation is achieving their desired goals. This doesn’t even take into account what I imagine must be frighteningly high attorneys’ fees.

Furthermore, when the majors use suits to police infringement, like they have, they can never let up. It’s not like there’s a tipping point around the corner where people would stop file sharing; and given the benefits of file-sharing in some contexts, I’m not sure that’s an end we especially want to reach.

The devils in the details, but I’m curious to see how the proposed business plan shakes out. Choruss may offer a permanent solution to a lingering and costly issue — for both labels and students.

Krishnamurthy: The Statutory Mechanical License in India: Whose Version [of the Law] is Correct?

Shourin Sen - 29 November 2008 – 10:38 pm

Filed under Academia, Foreign, India, Mechanical royalties, Music

Nikhil Krishnamurthy, everyone’s favorite Indian practitioner/flamethrower, recently posted an article on the compulsory license in musical compositions. I wrote about one of Mr. Krishnamurthy’s other papers last week.

Apparently, Indian courts have split on whether an artist can cover a song under the Copyright Act’s compulsory license provision without first obtaining permission from the original author (provided that an authorized version of the song has been released for two-years). The relevant part of Section 52(1)(j) of the Indian Copyright Act states as follows:

The following acts shall not constitute an infringement of copyright, namely: (j) the making of sound recordings in respect of any. . . musical work, if . . .(ii) the person making the sound recordings has given notice of his intention to make the sound recordings, has provided copies of all covers or labels with which the sound recordings are to be sold, and has paid in the prescribed manner to the owner of rights in the work royalties in respect of all such sound recordings to be made by him, at the rate fixed by the Copyright Board in this behalf[;] Provided that. . . (iii) no such sound recording shall be made until the expiration of two calendar years after the end of the year in which the first sound recording of the work was made. . .

Mr. Krishnamurthy contends that permission of the original author isn’t required for a subsequent musician to record a cover, provided that an authorized version of the original was released two-years earlier. First, Mr. Krishnamurthy’s argues that Section 52(1)(j) would be redundant if permission were always required. Secondly, Mr. Krishnamurthy makes the historical argument that Indian copyright law has featured a compulsory license provision since the Copyright Act of 1957 incorporated the scheme of the English Gregory Report (report of the Copyright Committee of 1952). Mr. Krishnamurthy’s states that, absent any evidence to the contrary, there should be a presumption that Parliament didn’t intend “drastic” changes to a policy the Indian Copyright Act has contained since its foundation.

___________________________

I find the idea that it would be financially advantageous for the Indian recording industry to limit covers interesting, even if it’s only for a period of two years. There is no comparable holding-period under American copyright law. This seems like the type of limitation that the American recording industry could have pushed Congress to enact years ago if there was any impetus. This brings us to my favorite topic: how it may be beneficial for individual countries to have differing copyright structures, and inversely, how differing copyright structures may foster varying performance practices.

I can think of a number of reasons for why the Indian recording industry might want a two-year exclusivity period, when it wouldn’t be called for in the U.S.:

First, as suggested by Mr. Krishnamurthy in his article, the Indian music industry is centered around Bollywood musicals. Given that film is central to marketing, it’s not unreasonable to think that songs in India are more important to a recording’s success than they are in the U.S. I.e. in India, songs are the stars; in the U.S., performers have a comparatively larger effect than songs on album sales.
The absence of a performance right in sound recordings under U.S. copyright law provides a disincentive for American musicians to make cover recordings. Unless an American musician records songs that they write, they are closed out of radio related royalties. Indian copyright law grants performance rights to both composers and performers so that, even if an Indian performer records a song they didn’t write, they still receive some royalties for radio play.
Perhaps there are segments of the Indian market that give less credence to branding and are more accepting of sound-alike albums than many segments of the American market.
It may be more costly to track sales of cover recordings for royalty collection in India than it is in the United States. It may make more sense for Indian labels to limit all covers rather than spending money trying to track cover sales.

These are just my best guesses. If any of this blog’s Indian readers would like to evaluate or add to the potential rationales, I would love to hear any comments.

Nikhil Krishnamurthy, The Statutory Mechanical License in India: Whose Version [Of the Law] is Correct?, Manupatra Intellectual Property Reports, MIPR, Vol. 1, p. A-115 (March 01, 2007).

SDNY Filings: Curtis James Jackson, III, “50 Cent” v. Taco Bell Corp

Shourin Sen - 24 November 2008 – 3:09 pm

Filed under Music, News

A surprisingly fun suit is brewing in the SDNY between rapper Curtis Jackson and Taco Bell Corp. According to the complaint, Taco Bell released a letter (below) on the company’s website. Curtis James Jackson, III, better known as a musician under his trade name “50 Cent,” brough suit seeking over one million dollars in damages for trademark infringement, false designation of sponsorship, and dilution, and an assortment of New York state law claims. Summarized in the complaint:

. . . Taco Bell knew that it would likely have had to pay Jackson a multi-million dollar fee to get his endorsement, even if he had agreed to do it (which is in doubt). Rather than face rejection or pay fair value, Taco Bell chose to steal his endorsement and to enjoy all the publicity of being associated with a mega-star while bearing none of the costs. Jackson brings this action to force Taco Bell to pay for diluting the value of his good name and to recover the fair value of his stolen endorsement.

The Answer, which denies most of the factual allegations, uses the following introduction:

Plaintiff Jackson is a self-described former drug dealer and hustler. He is now a rap music performer who uses the term “50 Cent” to identify himself His work falls in the sub-genre of hip hop music known as “gangsta rap,” a style associated with urban street gangs and characterized by violent, tough-talking braggadocio.

I wonder if the tone of the Answer is intended to provoke publicity.

Filings: