Category Archives: Misappropriation

SDNY grants summary judgment on hot news claim

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Filed under Misappropriation, Preemption

Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 2010 WL 1005160 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)

There was an order issued in the Southern District of New York (Cote, J.) in a case that merits very close watching. Theflyonthewall.com is a subscription based internet news service that aggregated and published investment recommendations and research from sixty-five investment firms along with investor orientated items. Brokerage firms created the research and recommendations, often at substantial cost, and distributed them to select investors as a means to drive trading.

Theflyonthewall obtained the stock recommendations of the investment management firms primarily via employee leaks. The President of Fly, however, testified that by 2009 “he was engaging in a ritualistic and labor-intensive process of “confirming” each Firm’s Recommendations from at least two and sometimes three independent sources before publishing them, still typically before the market opening.” Theflyonthewall.com had twenty-eight full time employees at the time of discovery and manually selected which stories to bring to the attention of its readers.

A group of four investment management firms brought suit (Lehman later dropped) for misappropriation of the time-sensitive recommendations contained in their equity research reports. The firms also brought a total of seventeen copyright infringement claims for the distribution, in each case, of a paragraph from the reports with attribution. In the action at bar, the investment firms moved for summary judgment on all claims. The copyright portion of the suit was resolved without a fight. The investment firms only pursued the minimum available statutory damages ($750 per work) along with attorneys’ fees, and Fly didn’t raise a fair use defense.

Misappropriation

The Court applied the five-factor test from National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir.1997)  and determined that the misappropriation claim was not preempted by the Copyright Act. Fly did not dispute the plaintiffs’ arguments that they (1) incurred substantial expense in generating their research reports and recommendations, and (2) that the information gathered was time-sensitive.

(3) Free-Riding

The Court’s analysis of free-riding was particularly interesting. Fly “vigorously” argued that it expended substantial energy aggregating the news. The Court found that “[t]o the extent that Fly add[ed] value through its collection and aggregation of information, . . .  the value reflected in that act of aggregation d[id] not controvert the fact that Fly expend[ed] no effort to produce the Recommendations and d[id] not contribute to the underlying research and analysis process.”

Fly also argued that, because it no longer appropriated the recommendations from the investment firms’ research reports, but instead relied on third-parties, the recommendations were public knowledge. Fly pointed to the “frequent publication of the Recommendations by other news services, both mainstream and internet, in advance of Fly’s own publication of headlines and to the widespread discussion of the Recommendations in market chat rooms and “blast IMs,” among other sources.” The Court’s response:

The fact that others also engage in unlawful behavior does not excuse a party’s own illegal conduct. Although the practices of other potentially liable parties is highly relevant to the fashioning of equitable relief and will be considered below, the conduct of third parties is simply of no moment in finding Fly liable for hot-news misappropriation. Similarly, even if true, it is not a defense to misappropriation that a Recommendation is already in the public domain by the time Fly reports it. In [ International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)], for example, AP’s news was already widespread and publicly available on the East Coast and was obtained by the defendant from public sources, and yet, the Court granted an injunction against INS’s further dissemination of news gained through those means. INS, 248 U.S. at 245-46; see also Bond Buyer, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 946 (enjoining defendant’s misappropriation of plaintiff’s bond-market reports even though they were already in the public domain).

(4) Direct competition

The Court found that Fly was in direct competition with the plaintiffs because “the Recommendations from those reports, [were] one of the “primary” businesses for each of the Firms.”

(5) Reduced economic incentives

The continued activities of Fly and similar actors, according to the Court, “would so reduce their incentive to invest the resources necessary to produce equity research reports that the continued viability of plaintiffs’ research business is and ‘would be substantially threatened’”; and that the “ability of the Firms to ‘monetize’ their research is critical to its continued production.”

Injunction

The Court enjoined Fly from distributing information from the research reports released when the market is closed for the later of either one half-hour after the opening of the New York Stock Exchange or 10:00 a.m. The Court further enjoined Fly from distributing recommendations issued while the NYSE is open for two hours after their release by the Firms. The Court included a provision that allowed Fly after a year to pursue the modification or vacating of the “injunction in the event that it can demonstrate that the Firms have not taken reasonable steps to restrain the systematic, unauthorized misappropriation of their Recommendations, for instance, through the initiation of litigation against any parties with whom negotiation proves unsuccessful.”

Comments:

I think many of us are eagerly anticipating a Second Circuit if not a Supreme Court opinion on the viability of hot news claims in the internet age. The Court’s order in this case was framed almost more like an arbitration decision than a federal court order. The Court appeared to strive for an injunction that the defendant’s could possibly abide by, and that wouldn’t be a target for appeal. So, this case may not end up being the vehicle that makes appellate law on misappropriation claims. If this case isn’t appealed, any site that aggregates financial news has a giant court-mandated target on it.

Bon Jovi’s motion to dismiss defendant’s Lanham Act and misappropriation of name counterclaims denied

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Filed under Lanham Act, Misappropriation

AFL Philadelphia LLC v. Krause, 2009 WL 1562992 (E.D. Pa. 2009)

The last time we checked in on this case the Court issued a rather elegant complete preemption and Merell Dow analysis.  On Thursday, the Court addressed Bon Jovi’s motion to dismiss the defendant’s Lanham Act and misappropriation of name counterclaims. I’ll let Judge Baylson reintroduce the facts of this case (apparently with help from his clerk):

In sports, as in legal battles, there are winners and there are losers, and the case before this Court tells the tale of both. In the instant matter, the local arena football team the Philadelphia Soul-partially owned by rock icon Jon Bongiovi (also known as Bon Jovi)-rose in a “Blaze of Glory”

to win the 2008 national championship Arena Bowl and then was “Shot Through the Heart”

when its 2009 season was cancelled by the League due to financial problems. The team and League remain “Living on a Prayer”

that they will return in the 2010 season and beyond. In the meantime, the Philadelphia Soul and a former employee are trading accusations concerning the fall-out of the season’s cancellation, in which they each experienced a taste of “Bad Medicine.”

To “kick off” this legal battle, Plaintiffs AFL Philadelphia LLC and Bongiovi brought copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and other assorted actions against [the Defendant]. Responding with a “turnover,” Defendant brought Counterclaims under the Lanham Act and for misappropriation of name. In the “first quarter” of what will undoubtedly be a hard fought battle, this Court will declare Defendant the winner and DENY Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s Counterclaims.

Win.

The defendant was the former director of ticket sales for the Philadelphia Soul, an Arena Football League franchise.  The AFL canceled its 2009 season, a move that the defendant claimed was “hugely unpopular” with the Soul’s fans.  The AFL’s season ticket holders were apparently irate about a team decision not to immediately issue refunds, and there were press reports of complaints to the AG.

Defendant further alleges the following: after his termination, the Philadelphia Soul sent an email to its fans about the season’s cancellation that falsely designated the origin of the email as having been sent from Defendant’s Philadelphia Soul email address; Defendant did not send the email, had no role in notifying fans of the season’s cancellation, and never authorized the Philadelphia Soul to use his name or email address for such a notification; by this false designation, the Philadelphia Soul sought to cause confusion amongst fans as to Defendant’s association with the unpopular decision to cancel the 2009 season and the resulting controversy over season ticket refunds; and the Soul traded on his good name and reputation amongst the fan base.

Secondary Meaning

The Court cited Lewis v. Marriott Int’l., Inc., 527 F.Supp.2d 422, 426 (E.D.Pa.2007) as analogous precedent, finding that the defendant’s counterclaim sufficiently pled factors that would establish secondary meaning, and that it wasn’t necessary for the defendant to establish secondary meaning between his name and the Philadelphia Soul:

In the instant case, Defendant has pled the following allegations related to secondary meaning: his well known and very favorable reputation in the sports and entertainment business as a media personality and public relations specialist for which Defendant was hired, utilization of Defendant’s reputation and relationships to promote the team and sell tickets, record breaking ticket sales due directly to his efforts, the distribution of an email falsely designated as having been sent from Defendant’s Philadelphia Soul email address, Plaintiffs’ intent to cause confusion amongst fans as to Defendant’s connection with the unpopular email by their false designation, and actual deceit or at least a tendency to deceive the public who received the falsely-designated email. Based on these allegations, the Court finds the following factors tend to show secondary meaning: length of use of Defendant’s favorable reputation in the industry during his tenure as Director of Sales, the extent of sales leading to buyer association based on Defendant’s reputation and relationships, large numbers of sales based on record breaking ticket sales, the fact of copying Defendant’s name by sending the falsely designated email, and actual confusion by the recipients of the email. Although this list represents only five of the eleven factors, Judge Robreno in Lewis denied defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the same factors present here.

Likelihood of Confusion

Bon Jovi argued that the defendant didn’t plead likelihood of confusion because the email did in fact originate from the Philadelphia Soul. The Court found that because the email contained the defendant’s name in the “From” line, it indicated that it “originated from the Defendant, albeit in his role as a Philadelphia Soul employee.”

Misappropriation of Name Claim

The Court found that the defendant adequately pled that Bon Jovi sought to appropriate the value of his name by benefiting from his reputation and prestige.

Scranton newspapers denied motion for remand to state court because of complete preemption

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Filed under Jurisdiction, Misappropriation, Preemption

On March 6, Judge A. Richard Caputo of the federal district court in Scranton, Pennsylvania issued a decision that addressed complete preemption (which is different than the preemption set forth in 17 U.S.C. 301).  The Scranton Times and the Times Partner published newspapers in Scranton, Pennsylvania.  Wilkes-Barre Publishing Company published a daily newspaper in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.

Wilkes-Barre began publication of a “Scranton Edition” of it’s daily newspaper which contained obituaries.  The Scranton Times and Times Partner alleged that, for a period of five days, Wilkes-Barre copied obituaries from their newspapers and/or websites.

The Scranton Times and the Times Partner filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County stating claims for misappropriation, unfair competition, conversion, fraud, breach of contract, tortious interference with existing business relations, and unjust enrichment.  Wilkes-Barre removed the case to the federal district court in Scranton.

Complete preemption

The Scranton Times and the Times Partner filed a motion to remand the case to the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas on the grounds that the federal court didn’t have jurisdiction because the Plaintiffs didn’t bring any federal claims.  The Court rejected this argument on the doctrine of complete preemption:

“A state claim which is ‘really one of federal law’ may be removed to federal court because ‘it is an independent corollary of the well-pleaded complaint rule that a plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions in a complaint.’ ”  “The Supreme Court has held that a state cause of action is ‘really’ a federal cause of action which may be removed to federal court if the “federal cause of action completely preempts … the state cause of action.” Goepel v. National Postal Mail Handlers Union, 36 F.3d 306, 310 (3d Cir.1994) (quoting Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). [some citation omitted]

The Court found that while the Plaintiffs’  claims made no mention of federal copyright law, they “may not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions” in their complaint.  The Court then determined that the state law claims for misappropriation, unfair competition, tortuous interference with business relations and unjust enrichment were  completely preempted by the Copyright Act.  Thus, the Court found that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the  four claims.

The Court further found that it had supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims of conversion, fraud and breach of contract that weren’t completely preempted.

Misappropriation

The Scranton Times and the Times Partner brought a claim for misappropriation under INS v. AP.  Judge Caputo “agree[d] with” the Second Circuit’s holding in National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc.,105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir.1997) that “only a narrow ‘hot news’ misappropriation claim survives preemption for actions concerning material within the realm of copyright.”  Thus, the Court turned to the extra elements that allow a misappropriation claim “styled on” AP v. INS to survive preemption:

(i) the time-sensitive value of factual information,

(ii) the free-riding by a defendant, and

(iii) the threat to the very existence of the product or service provided by the plaintiff.”

The Court found that Scranton Times and the Times Partner satisfied the (i) time sensitive element because the time and place of funeral services are time sensitive.  The Court further found that the allegations made in the complaint that the Wilkes-Barr Publishing Company copied the death notices found in Plaintiffs’ publications into its own newspaper-satisfied the (ii) “free-riding” element.

In regards to the (iii) threat to the very existence of the product or service, the Court found that Plaintiffs’ hadn’t alleged that the use of their obituaries for five days threatened the existence of their publications:

The Court acknowledges that these statements certainly allege that the Defendant caused Plaintiffs some actual loss during the five (5) day period of alleged plagiarism activity, along with speculative future losses in terms of goodwill, customer loyalty, and business relationships. The Court does not, however, find that Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant’s activities have threatened the existence of their publications or has compromised or provided reduced incentive for Plaintiffs to continue collecting obituaries and printing them for public distribution.

Documents

The Scranton Times, L.P. et al v. Wilkes-Barre Publishing Company, 08 cv 02135 ARC, 2009 WL 585502 (M.D. Pa. March 15, 2009)