Copyright Law Blog: Exclusive Rights

DOJ Amicus in Google Books: Despite substantial progress, substantial issues remain

Admin - 8 February 2010 – 9:00 am

On Thursday, the Department of Justice filed an amicus brief in the Google Books Settlement litigation arguing against the adoption of the proposed amended settlement agreement. The brief recognized the promise of the proposal and the substantial progress made from the original settlement proposal, but noted that antitrust concerns remain:

As the United States noted in its September 18, 2009 Statement of Interest (D.E. 720) (“U.S. SOI”), widespread lawful electronic distribution and use of copyrighted works, including in-print, out-of-print, and so-called “orphan” works, holds vast promise. Breathing life into millions of works that are now effectively dormant, allowing users to search the text of millions of books at no cost, creating a rights registry, and enhancing the accessibility of such works for the disabled and others are all worthy objectives.

It was with those objectives in mind that the United States encouraged discussions among the parties regarding possible modifications of the original Proposed Settlement (“Proposed Settlement” or “PS”) to address the many concerns raised by various commenters and the United States. In response, the parties made a number of substantial changes to the Proposed Settlement. For example, the ASA: eliminates the open-ended provisions that would have conveyed to Google the rights to engage in unspecified future uses of the works covered by the ASA (compare PS § 4.7 with ASA § 4.7); calls for an Unclaimed Works Fiduciary (“Fiduciary” or “UWF”) subject to court approval to protect owners of unclaimed works (ASA § 6.2(b)(iii)); provides that, after five years, 25 percent of unclaimed funds from unclaimed works may be used to locate the respective rightsholders (rather than be redistributed to other members of the Book Rights Registry) (ASA § 6.3(a)(i)(2)); reduces the number of foreign works in the settlement class (compare PS § 1.19 with ASA § 1.19); and eliminates the most-favored-nation provision (PS § 3.8(a)) that would have guaranteed Google optimal license terms into the future.

Despite this substantial progress, substantial issues remain. Although the United States believes the parties have approached this effort in good faith and the ASA is more circumscribed in its sweep than the original Proposed Settlement, the ASA suffers from the same core problem as the original agreement: it is an attempt to use the class action mechanism to implement forward-looking business arrangements that go far beyond the dispute before the Court in this litigation. As a consequence, the ASA purports to grant legal rights that are difficult to square with the core principle of the Copyright Act that copyright owners generally control whether and how to exploit their works during the term of copyright. Those rights, in turn, confer significant and possibly anticompetitive advantages on a single entity – Google. Under the ASA as proposed, Google would remain the only competitor in the digital marketplace with the rights to distribute and otherwise exploit a vast array of works in multiple formats. Google also would have the exclusive ability to exploit unclaimed works (including so-called “orphan works”) without risk of liability. The ASA’s pricing mechanisms, though in some respects much improved, also continue to raise antitrust concerns.

The DOJ brief also listed eight steps it “recommended” to mitigate the risks to rightsholders of out-of-print, unclaimed, and orphan works, if the Court were to find, contrary to its opinion, that the settlement was consistent with the Court’s Rule 23 authority:

Use an opt-in regime for the forward-looking aspects of the settlement
Create a meaningful waiting period before Google may commercially exploit out-of-print works without the permission of the rightsholder (e.g., two years from the time the title is publicly listed in the Registry).
Delay or condition acceptance of the modified settlement agreement until the Unclaimed Works Fiduciary and the Registry set standards designed to further reduce the volume of unclaimed works after expiration of the waiting period.
With respect to out-of-print works, at the expiration of the mandatory waiting period, require a reasonably diligent search for the rightsholder by either Google or the Registry, and public disclosure of the results of that search, before the opt-out provisions can apply to the exploitation of new commercial products.
Qualify the definition of “Book” in ASA § 1.19 with respect to foreign rightsholders to capture those books that are (1) “United States work[s]” as defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101 and registered with the U.S. Copyright Office, or (2) if first published in Canada, the UK, or Australia, were also published in the United States at a later date or registered with the U.S. Copyright Office.
Limit exploitation to a defined term, such as five or ten years, after which period the marketplace could be reassessed. At the end of this limited license term, renewal of the license could be negotiated by the Registry; or the Court could retain jurisdiction over the case for the sole purpose of reviewing whether the term should be extended or revised upon its expiration.
Make the parties agree to comply with the terms of any copyright legislation enacted in the future governing areas addressed by the modified settlement agreement.
Examine whether there exists a means for rival distributors to access orphan and rights-uncertain works consistent with Rule 23.

80’s hit “Down Under” infringes “Kookaburra,” Australian Fed Court

Admin - 5 February 2010 – 9:00 am

Filed under: Australia, Music

In early August, I mentioned a case Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Ltd v EMI Songs Australia Pty Limited pending in the Federal Court of Australia in Sydney. To briefly review, Larrikin, an Australian music publisher, alleged that the 1980s hit “Down Under” infringed it’s copyright in the round “Kookaburra Sits in the Old Gum Tree.” At the time, the Court found that Larrikin was the rightsholder of “Kookaburra,” and the original author had not assigned the song to the Victorian Girl Guides in 1932.

The Honourable Justice Jacobson found yesterday (Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Ltd v EMI Songs Australia Pty Limited [2010] FCA 29) that “Down Under” infringed “Kookaburra,” and that Larrikin was also entitled to recover damages for the infringment under the Fair Trading Act. The Court schedule proceedings on damages but noted that Larrikin’s claim to be entitled to 40-60% of the income of “Down Under” “grossly over-reache[d] a proper allocation of any such entitlement.”

Infringement

A plaintiff under the Australian Copyright Act must show that a defendant copied a “substantial part” of her work. The Court found that “Down Under” was infringing because a qualitatively important part of the song was appropriated and that, “although the question of quantity is secondary to that of quality, it is worthwhile noting that two of the four bars or phrases of “Kookaburra” have been reproduced in Down Under (or 50% of the song).” The Court noted that “Kookburra” was a simple work, but had sufficient originality to be granted copyright protection, and that the appropriation merited a finding of infringement.

Hypothetical license appropriate measure of actual damages even if parties unlikely to enter license

Admin - 4 February 2010 – 9:00 am

Filed under: Damages

Oracle USA, Inc. v. SAP AG, 2010 WL 334446 (N.D. Cal. 2009)

Oracle brought a copyright infringement suit against SAP seeking, among other things, actual damages. Title 17 Section 504 of the Copyright Act provides that a plaintiff may recover either statutory damages, or “the actual damages suffered by [the copyright owner] as a result of the infringement” and “any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages.” The Ninth Circuit, the Court noted, uses a fair market value retroactive license fee as one measure of actual damages.

SAP moved for a summary judgment ruling that Oracle could not pursue damages in the form of a hypothetical license. SAP argued that, if it were not for the infringement, the arch-rivals would not have entered into a licensing agreement. The Northern District of California (Hamilton, J.) denied SAP’s motion, and allowed Oracle to present evidence regarding the market value of the license. Stated the Court, “The question is not what Oracle would have charged for a license, but what is the fair market value.”

On Salinger v. Colting

Admin - 3 February 2010 – 9:00 am

Filed under: Parody, Preliminary Injunction

Tamera Bennett has posted an update on her blog on Salinger v. Colting. The case, currently on appeal in the Second Circuit, was being looked to as potentially providing a gloss on the test for parody, and the standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction in copyright cases. The plaintiff in the case, author J.D. Salinger, passed on January 27. My condolences go out to the family and friends of the late author. Ms. Bennett points to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 25 for what happens next in the case:

If a party dies and the claim is not extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper party. A motion for substitution may be made by any party or by the decedent’s successor or representative. If the motion is not made within 90 days after service of a statement noting the death, the action by or against the decedent must be dismissed.

First Circuit: Copyright Act does not preempt termination of license under NY contract law

Admin - 2 February 2010 – 9:00 am

Filed under: Licensing, Music, Preemption, Termination

Latin American Music Co. v. American Society Of Composers Authors And Publishers, 2010 WL 324526 (1st Cir. 2010)

The First Circuit (Torruella, Baldock, Howard writing) addressed what is to my knowledge a novel issue concerning the requirement that a transfer of ownership must be in writing. Caballo Viejo, which translates to “Old Horse,” is a popular folk song in Venezuela. In September 1981, the composer of Caballo Viejo granted exclusive rights in the song to a predecessor of a predecessor of ASCAP. A predecessor of ASCAP (which obtained the rights from the predecessor of the predecessor, got that?) transferred exclusive rights in the song to a predecessor of Latin American Music Company in 1982. The contract between the predecessor of ASCAP and the predecessor of Latin American Music Company, which was formed in New York, did not specify a termination date, the conditions under which the exclusive license could be terminated, or the manner in which the license could be terminated.

A dispute arose between ASCAP and Latin American Music Company over copyright ownership. ASCAP claimed that it was the actual owner of the song because its predecessor had terminated the 1982 contract granting exclusive rights to Latin American Music Company. The only testimony presented at trial on the issue was a deposition of the president of ASCAP’s predecessor, stating that he had terminated the 1982 agreement with Latin American Music Company’s predecessor during a conversation with the counterparty’s president.

The First Circuit stated that New York law provides that an agreement of this type “remains in force for a reasonable time and is subject to termination upon reasonable notice. Italian & French Wine Co. of Buffalo, Inc. v. Negociants U.S.A., Inc., 842 F.Supp. 693, 699 (W.D.N.Y.1993) (“[W]ell-settled New York law [ ] provides that a contract with no stated duration is terminable only after a reasonable duration and after reasonable notice is given.”); see also Laugh Factory, Inc. v. Basciano, 608 F.Supp.2d 549, 556 (S.D.N.Y.2009); Rogers v. HSN Direct Joint Venture, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12111, at * 3 (S.D .N.Y. Aug. 6, 1999).”

On appeal, Latin American Music Company argued that the Copyright Act preempted (conflict preemption) the New York State contract law default rule of termination; that the termination had to be in writing. Title 17 Section 204 of the Copyright Act provides:

(a) A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.

Latin American Music Company argued that since it had owned exclusive rights in the song, the termination of the agreement, without a writing, was an invalid transfer of ownership. Since there was no writing, according to Latin American Music Company, there was no transfer.

The Court found that Section 204 did not apply to terminations of copyright ownership under New York State Law:

Section 204, which requires a writing signed by the transferor, however, applies to the transfer or grant of copyright ownership, not to the termination of such a transfer or grant. [Latin American Music Company] cites no case suggesting otherwise, nor are we are aware of any such case. Moreover, extending-204 to the termination of copyright interests would lead to untenable results. A transferee of a copyright interest could effectively veto a lawful termination of that interest by refusing to reconvey that interest to the terminating party under-204. For example, in this case, [Latin American Music Company], the transferee, could have prevented [ASCAP's predecessor in interest] from terminating the exclusive license by simply choosing not to reconvey the license to West Side through either an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of transfer.

The First Circuit also found that 17 U.S.C. 203 did not preempt the transfer. The Court found that the section only applied to situations where an author or an author’s statutory heirs are terminating a grant.

Cal Court of Appeals finds that First Amendment bars right of publicity claims against Rolling Stone

Admin - 1 February 2010 – 9:00 am

Filed under: First Amendment, Right of Publicity, Unfair Competition

Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC, 2010 WL 317016 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 2009)

The California First Appellate District (Marchiano, Margulies, Dondero writing) issued a First Amendment decision in an interesting right of publicity case on Thursday. The class action plaintiffs were a group of one hundred and eighty-six Indie Rock musicians whose band names were featured in a centerfold spread “Indie Rock Universe” in the November 15, 2007 issue of Rolling Stone.

The spread contained five pages of content and four pages of advertisements for Camel cigarettes. The plaintiffs brought three claims against Rolling Stone and R.J. Reynolds: (1) the unauthorized use of name in violation of California Civil Code section 3344, (2) a common law right of publicity claim for unauthorized use of name for commercial advantage, and (3) a claim for unfair competition claim for violation of California Business and Professions Code sections 17200-17203.

At bar, Rolling Stone appealed from the trial court’s order denying its special motion to strike a class action complaint under California’s Anti-SLAPP provisions. Rolling Stone (R.J. Reynolds wasn’t a party on appeal) argued that there wasn’t a triable issue as to whether the foldout constituted commercial speech, and that the plaintiffs did not present evidence sufficient to establish that they had a probability of prevailing on the merits. The California Court of Appeals agreed and reversed, finding that Rolling Stone was shielded by the First Amendment’s Freedom of Speech and Press protections.

Was the speech commercial? Was clear and convincing evidence of actual malice required?

The trial court found that the foldout was commercial speech on behalf of Rolling Stone because the magazine, through its “layout decision,” published “an allegedly integrated 9-page advertisement” for Camel cigarettes. The trial court found that a trier of fact could conclude that the feature was commercial speech because it was “inextricably intertwined” with the advertisement. The Court of Appeals looked to both the Ninth Circuit’s and California Supreme Court’s tests for commercial speech and found that the speech was non-commercial:

Simply put, there is no legal precedent for converting noncommercial speech into commercial speech merely based on its proximity to the latter. There is also no precedent for converting a noncommercial speaker into a commercial speaker in the absence of any direct interest in the product or service being sold. We thus conclude that the Feature is noncommercial speech.

The Court of Appeals next looked to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-280 (1964) for the proposition that a “plaintiff who is either a public official or public figure may not recover damages for defamation absent proof that the defendant published defamatory statements with ‘actual malice,’ that is, either with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth.” The Court of Appeals found that as non-commercial speech the plaintiff needed to show actual malice for the commercial misappropriation claims brought under the common law and Section 3344. The Court dismissed finding that the plaintiff could not present evidence that would surmount the First Amendment defense.

Freedom of Press

The Court of Appeals further found that the plaintiff’s claims were also barred by the First Amendment Freedom of Press protections:

It is well established that “The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.” ( Miami Herald Publishing Co., Division of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo (1974) 418 U.S. 241, 258 [41 L.Ed.2d 730, 94 S.Ct. 2831].) “[T]he courts have long held that the right to control the content of a privately published newspaper rests entirely with the newspaper’s publisher. The First Amendment protects the newspaper itself, and grants it a virtually unfettered right to choose what to print and what not to.” ( Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1391 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 802].)

First Circuit finds unfinished works are granted moral rights

Admin - 29 January 2010 – 9:00 am

Filed under: VARA

Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art Foundation, Inc. v. Buchel, 08-2199 (1st Cir. 2010)

The First Circuit (Howard, Woodckock, Lipez writing) issued a mammoth decision on Wednesday that addressed a number of interesting issues concerning the Visual Artists Rights Act. An artist conceived and partially executed a football-field sized art installation which was to be exhibited at the Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art. The artist and the museum never entered into a written contract. The relationship between the two parties soured and the work was never fully completed.

The Museum sought a declaration in federal court that it was “entitled to present to the public the materials and partial constructions” it had collected for the work. The artist responded with a series of counterclaims under the Copyright Act and the Visual Artists Rights Act, seeking damages and an injunction against the display of the unfinished art work.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Museum on all claims, finding that no genuine issues of material fact existed. The First Circuit vacated the granting of summary judgment on the claim for copyright infringement (right to display) and violation of the right of integrity granted in VARA.

Are unfinished works granted rights under VARA?

As an initial question, the First Circuit addressed whether unfinished works are granted rights under VARA. The Court found that the definition in 17 USC 101 for a “work of visual art” governed the provisions in VARA, and found that VARA applied to unfinished works:

. . . VARA is part of the Copyright Act, and that Act’s definition section, which defines “work of visual art,” specifies that its definitions, unless otherwise provided, control throughout Title 17. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. That general definitional section of the Copyright Act states that a work is “created” when it “is fixed in a copy . . . for the first time.” Further, “where a work is prepared over a period of time, the portion of it that has been fixed at any particular time constitutes the work as of that time.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).

Is there a different burden of proof in a claim for violation of VARA right of integrity when seeking an injunction and when seeking damages?

The Court addressed whether a plaintiff had the same burden of proof to be awarded an injunction and damages for a violation of integrity.The Court found that a similar showing of prejudice is required for a plaintiff to be awarded damages and an injunction:

Some courts, however, have assumed without analysis that the prejudice showing is necessary for both injunctive relief and damages. See, e.g., Hanrahan v. Ramirez, No. 2:97-CV-7470, 1998 WL 34369997, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 1998) (citing 17 U.S.C. §
106A(a)(3)); Carter v. Helmsley-Spear,Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 329-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and rev’d in part by Carter, 71 F.3d at 77. At least one commentator likewise accepts, without discussion, that the damages remedy requires a showing of prejudice. See Melville B. Nimmer, 3-8D Nimmer on Copyright § 8D.06[C][1] (noting that “an intentional and prejudicial mutilation is an integrity violation, remediable through not only an injunction, but damages as well”).

* * * * *

We agree with Nimmer’s view of the provision, including the application of the prejudice requirement to a claim for damages, and consider that construction soundly grounded in VARA’s legislative history.

Can a plaintiff seek damages or merely an injunction for a violation of the right to attribution?

The First Circuit also found that a plaintiff can only seek an injunction, and not damages, for a violation of the right to attribution:

We agree with Nimmer’s surmise that VARA does not provide a damages remedy for an attribution violation. Where the statutory language is framed as a right “to prevent” conduct, it does not necessarily follow that a plaintiff is entitled to damages once the conduct occurs. The question is whether “doing” the act the artist has a right to prevent also triggers a damages remedy, and the statutory language indicates that Congress answered that question for the attribution right differently from the integrity right.

Copyright Office: Distribution of a work online is a publication

Admin - 27 January 2010 – 7:47 pm

Filed under: Copyright Office, Distribution Right, Publication, Registration

The Copyright Office has adopted an interim regulation that alters the deposit exemption for works available only online. Previously, automated databases available only online were exempted from the mandatory deposit requirements. The exemption was implemented in 1989 because the Copyright Office “in the early 1990s had neither the intention nor the technology to collect such works.”

The Copyright Office has up until now interpreted the exemption to apply to all online-only publications because at the time the exemption was implemented, “for all practical purposes,” the only works being published online were the automated Westlaw and Nexis databases.

The new regulation

In the new regulation “electronic serials” (‘‘This class includes periodicals; newspapers; annuals; and the journals, proceedings, transactions, etc. of societies.’’) are subject to a qualified deposit requirement. Not all rights holders will be requested to deposit their works. The Copyright Office will make demands on authors, at its discretion. A rights holder will then have three months to deposit the work, barring the Office granting additional time in special circumstances.

The logistics for the submission of online–only works will be developed by the Office in consultation with content owners.The Office was not ready to adopt a policy where rights-holders could by provide a website link so that the Office could download the works itself. The effective date for the new reg is February 24, 2010. It only applies to works published on or after the effective date.

Blogs

In comments, West publishing requested that the definition of serials be revised so that it could not be read to cover databases and blogs. The Office, in response, limited the definition of electronic serials to works “issued or intended to be issued on an established schedule, in successive parts bearing numerical or chronological designations, without subsequent alterations.’’ The Office noted it believed that this definition does not include blogs or databases that are publications with “no demarcations between particular, discrete issues of the publication.”

I’m not convinced the definition of electronic serials still doesn’t cover blogs. Many blogs, like mine, create posts that are automatically numbered by date or post number in the URL. Regardless, the Office’s comments imply that, at least for the time being, they are unlikely to make deposit demands upon blog owners.

Online distribution as publication

The deposit requirement enacted in 17 U.S.C. 402 only applies to works published in the United States. D.C. attorney Patrice Lyons queried whether the distribution of works only online constitutes a publication. Section 101 of title 17 defines ‘‘publication’’ as follows:

“Publication” is the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display, constitutes publication. A public performance or display of a work does not of itself constitute publication.

To perform or display a work “publicly” means—

(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a

family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or

(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.

It is possible to argue that the distribution of a work on the internet is not a publication because there is no “sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.”

In mid-October, we encountered this issue in Moberg v. 33T LLC, 2009 WL 3182606 (D. Del. 2009). In the case, a defendant moved to dismiss a copyright action brought by a Swedish photographer. The defendant argued that the work was a U.S. work because it was published online concurrently in the US and abroad. As a U.S. work, the defendant argued, the photographer needed to register the works at issue before bringing suit. The Court sidestepped the question of whether a publication had occurred and found that, regardless of whether there was a publication, there was not concurrent publication in the United States and a foreign country.

The Copyright Office in the regulation found that the distribution of a work on the internet constitutes a publication:

Because ‘‘[u]nder the definition in section 101, a work is ‘published’ if one or more copies or phonorecords embodying it are distributed to the public,’’ H.R. Rep. No. 96–1976, at 138 (1976), it follows that the electronic transmission of copies of a work to the public, as addressed in the distribution context in Tasini and Grokster, constitutes publication of that work.

So what does this mean?

Statutory damages are not available under 17 USC 412 for (1) the infringement of copyrights in unpublished works commenced before the effective date of its registration, or (2) any infringement of copyright commenced after first publication of theve found work and before the effective date of its registration, unless such registration is made within three months after the first publication of the work.

Authors of domestic works should be aware that, if Courts adopt the language in the regulation as guidance, they have a three month window to register after they place a work on the internet. In this window an author can still seek statutory damages and attorneys’ fees, even if infringement occurs before the effective date of the registration. If a court were to find that the distribution of an online-only work does not constitute a publication there is no window.

The language in the regulation raises the importance of the Moberg decision for works created outside of the United States and first published online. Previously a court could have found that not all works first published on the internet are U.S. works (due to concurrent publication in the US and abroad) because an online distribution does not constitute a publication. If court’s adopt the Office’s analysis, the only way a work first published online is not a U.S. work is if a tribunal adopts the policy-based findings in Moberg.

Supreme Court denies cert in Arista Records v. Launch Media

Admin - 26 January 2010 – 1:26 pm

Filed under: Compulsory License, Copyright Royalty Board, Digital Audio Transmission, Music, Supreme Court

On Monday, the Supreme Court denied Sony BMG’s cert petition in Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 2009 WL 2568733 (2d. Cir. 2009). If a person offers an “interactive service,” as defined in the Act, she must pay an individual licensing fee for musical selections and not just the compulsory license rate set by the Copyright Royalty Board. The general rationale behind the provision is to ensure that webcasters must individually clear songs if they offer an on-demand musical service, not just pay the compulsory royalty rate.

Launch Media provided an internet radio site that allowed users to create stations from their preferences, such as a genre, artist or song. Sony argued it was an interactive service, defined in the Act as a service “that enables a member of the publc to receive a transmission of a program specially created for the recipient, or on request, a transmission of a particular sound recording …, which is selected by or on behalf of the recipient.”

The Second Circuit found that Launch Media service was not an “interactive service” and that the company only needed to obtain a compulsory license to offer musical selections. Sony BMG petitioned the Supreme Court, and was denied.

Announcing the Law Office of Shourin Sen — ATTORNEY ADVERTISING

Admin - 21 January 2010 – 10:09 am

Filed under: Meta

Announcing the Law Office of Shourin Sen

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